



**Draft Election Security Position**  
**League of Women Voters of Colorado**  
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The election process is the foundation of our representative form of government. Election integrity, accuracy, transparency, security and trustworthiness require vigilance for public confidence.

Security requirements include but are not limited to:

1. **Voter registration databases** must be accurate, regularly updated, transparent, and able to be independently audited. Individuals must be able to verify their own records.
2. **Chain of custody security** with strict protocols to show direct accountability and control of key systems and passwords. Designate select personnel with appropriate expertise to enforce limited access to original ballots. Strictly document ballot access times and places.
3. **Election officials, workers, and volunteers** must be qualified and trained, with no history of fraud or election offense, and no relationship to candidates.
4. **Assure sensitive task security** by team oversight, with no two team members from the same political party.
5. **Voting systems**, both hardware and software, must be supported, tested, accessible and secure.
6. **Voter-verifiability**, allowing voters to verify the content of their votes, such as seeing their paper ballots before casting them; and/or verify that recording and tabulation occurred as they intended.
7. **Auditability**, requiring “software independence.” Election outcome changes or errors caused by software must be detectable without relying on software. We must ensure that accurate vote counts are possible; for example, by using voter-verifiable paper ballots which can be recounted.
8. **Limit less secure voting methods**, such as online ballot return, to those few who cannot physically use and return a voter-verifiable paper ballot; as all online methods will be less private and less secure.
9. **Ballot recounts** and efficient risk-limiting audits must be possible.
10. **Require post election audits**, including risk-limiting audits, for *all* contests, to allow the public to verify reported outcomes and to instill overall trust.
11. **Protect individual voter’s privacy**, including against coercion and intimidating post-election door-to-door canvassing.

## 12. **Develop and rehearse contingency plans** for disasters and cybersecurity recovery.

### **More on Election Security:**

Elections should be structured to provide convincing evidence that the reported outcomes actually reflect how people voted (evidence-based elections).

Conducting elections securely and with ballot anonymity is much harder than secure banking because financial transactions can be traced. Although online banking security frequently fails, the customer's identity is known so corrections and restitution can be made, even well after the fact. Ballots cannot be traced to individual voters.

All eligible voters should be able to vote privately and independently, with strong ballot protections and overall election security, including, where needed, electronic blank ballot delivery to voters, mailing paper ballots to uniformed and absentee overseas voters (UOCAVA) 45 days in advance, and providing accessible polling place equipment.

For those few who must return ballots online, use of a software-independent approach such as an end-to-end verifiable Internet voting system (E2E-VIV) is preferable, even though it remains significantly less private and less secure than paper ballots.

Different vendors' election system components should communicate with each other in standardized ways (interoperability), so election officials can mix and match, encouraging competition and innovation.

The public should have access to copies of election equipment source code, samples of election equipment, copies of ballots (with personally identifying information removed), and copies of procedures. Passwords and other authentication secrets must be secured. Election officials must remain in control of ballots and the actual equipment and software used.

The public should be welcome to watch the election and audit processes closely enough to verify their integrity, without interfering in an ongoing process. The public should have a mechanism to address election process flaws, if possible while an election is still underway, again without interfering in ongoing elections.